Abstract. We use an important legal event as a natural experiment to examine equity-debt conflicts in the vicinity of financial distress. A 1991 Delaware bankruptcy ruling changed the nature of corporate directors' fiduciary duties in that state. This change limited incentives to take actions favoring equity over debt. We show that, as predicted, this increased the likelihood of equity issues, increased investment, and reduced risk taking. The changes are isolated to indebted firms (where the legal change applied). These reductions in agency costs were followed by an increase in average leverage and a reduction in interest costs. Finally, we can estimate the welfare implications of agency costs, because firm values increased when the rules were introduced. We conclude that equity-bond holder conflicts are economically important, determine capital structure choices, and affect welfare.
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Managerial decisions influence the distribution of value between different parties. This can lead to conflicting interests among financial claimants, such as holders of equity and debt (Fama and Miller 1972 , Jensen and Meckling 1976 , Myers 1977 .
1 Equity holders may prefer low investment, may want to limit new equity finance, and may like high risks. 2 Such costs are potentially important in light of the large apparent tax advantages of debt in conjunction with modest leverage levels (e.g. Graham 2000) . 3 Unfortunately, agency costs are hard to identify empirically, and their importance, and even existence, is not well established. For example, insufficient or excessively risky investment can only be defined with reference to the socially optimal level, which is hard to estimate. Despite the challenge involved in measuring agency costs, they have a prominent role in capital structure theory. Indirect methods, such as studying firms in financial distress, are much complicated by the correlation of financial and economic distress (Asquith, Gertner, Scharfstein 1994 and Andrade and Kaplan 1998) . So far, the strongest case for the existence of these agency costs is probably indirect, coming from the fact that debt contracts include a multitude of covenants aiming to curb opportunistic behavior of management (Smith and Warner, 1979 ).
We present a novel approach to identifying debt-equity conflicts and the associated agency costs, employing a 1991 legal event as a natural experiment. Our natural experiment revolves around the fiduciary duties of corporate officers. Broadly speaking, these duties require that officers take actions that are in the interest of owners. Historically, the position of U.S. courts has been that such duties are owed to the firm as a whole and to its owners, but not to other firm stakeholders, such as creditors.
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The case ruling argued that when a firm is not insolvent, but in the "zone of insolvency", duties may already be owed to creditors. There was extensive press coverage at the ruling, and considerable debate and analysis about the implications, in the following months. The case was widely perceived to have created a new obligation for directors of Delaware-incorporated firms. For example, in the following March, Forbes Magazine reported that, following "a recent decision by William Allen ", "…when a company is in serious trouble, the director's responsibility shifts somewhat in the direction of the creditors" (Forbes, 1992) . Exactly what constituted the zone of insolvency was not perfectly clear. Before these issues could be settled definitively by further court rulings, Delaware courts had backed off somewhat from the Credit Lyonnais 1991 duties. Especially the 2004 Production Resources Group v NCT and 2007 N. Am. Cath. Ed. Programming Found., Inc. v . Gheewalla cases ended up limiting the ability of creditors to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware corporate law.
The Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications legal episode provides an interesting opportunity to assess the extent of creditor-equity holder conflict and the impact of such conflict on equilibrium capital structure. For a period of time, starting in January 1992, directors of Delaware corporations, but not of firms incorporated elsewhere, had stronger duties to creditors. This presumably limited the extent to which directors and managers were willing to take actions favoring equity at the expense of debt, as duties shifted.
Of course, fiduciary duties are not the only, and probably not the most important, motivators for corporate decisions making. Managers are subject to financial incentives (see e.g. Murphy 1999) , face termination risk (Kaplan 1994) , and have career concerns (Fama 1980) . The business judgment rule limits the importance of the fiduciary duties. 6 On the other hand, if fiduciary duties matter, they may matter most for firms facing financial distress, where financial incentives are likely fairly weak. To what extent these duties affect managerial decision-making is an empirical question. Our empirical methodology tests the joint hypotheses that duties drive some managerial decisions and that Credit Lyonnais changed corporate officers' perception of their duties.
Using a difference-in-difference methodology, we examine both behavioral changes (e.g. investment) and leverage outcomes following Credit Lyonnais. The difference-in-difference methodology contrasts public firms incorporated in Delaware and to those incorporated elsewhere, and before and after 1991. We use firm fixed effects to control for any heterogeneity or pre-existing differences between firms incorporated in Delaware and those incorporated elsewhere. We also examine the prediction that low debt firms should not be affected by the Credit Lyonnais ruling. Since the case only created new duties for firms in the zone of insolvency, any changes in corporate behavior which were driven by Credit Lyonnais should be particularly visible for firms in financial distress, but might be absent altogether for firms with low leverage and default risk.
Our tests examine some of the main debt-equity conflicts that have been proposed in the theoretical literature. Existing equity holders of distressed firms may wish to reduce investment and be reluctant to provide equity financing for investment (see Myers 1977) . This agency problem is often called debt 4 overhang. In firms with a non-trivial probability of default on debt obligations, shareholders can gain by increasing risk, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , which is often called risk shifting. The gain comes at the expense of creditors. Managers of highly levered firms can borrow more and pay out cash to shareholders. 7 Also, equityholders miay wish for managers to play for time, for example by inflating profits, in order to delay bankruptcy (Asquith, Gertner, Scharfstein, 1994). 8 First, when a firm is highly leveraged, and debt is risky, equity-holders have a disincentive to raise new capital to invest in safe projects, even if these projects have a positive net present value. The reason is that the value of the investment would largely go to creditors by making debt less risky and expected debt recovery higher, while only having a minor effect on equity value. This conflict was first emphasized by Myers (1977) and is commonly known as the debt overhang problem. Second, equity-holders have an incentive to increase the riskiness of the existing assets, even in cases when this reduces the net present value of the firm. This is because the benefits of higher risk primarily go to equity-holders thanks to their limited liability, while the costs are primarily born by creditors due to their limited upside payoff. This conflict is commonly known as the risk-shifting problem, and is originally credited to Jensen and Meckling (1976) . A third implication of these theories is that the inability of equity-holders to precommit not to under-invest or shift risk should make debt more costly (and less desirable) ex ante, since creditors will protect themselves through higher interest and restrictive covenants.
We find evidence consistent with of all three of these predictions.
First, Delaware firms are more likely to issue equity in the wake of Credit Lyonnais. This increase is apparent in unconditional data as illustrated in Figure 1 , which shows how the frequency of positive net equity issuance was the same across Delaware and non-Delaware firms until 1991, that the rate of issuance was higher after 1991 for both groups, and that the increase was larger in Delaware firms. The change for Delaware firms is driven entirely by firms with above median leverage, and is absent in low leverage firms. Payout to owners (e.g. dividends) is in some sense the opposite of equity issues, and payout favors equity over debt. However, there is no reduction in dividends or repurchases after Credit Lyonnais. 9 Moreover, investment increased after Credit Lyonnais. 10 This is true for capital expenditures as well as for R&D. Again, the effect is driven entirely by relatively highly levered firms, while we find no effect for firms with low leverage. The investment increase is economically significant (on the order of half a percent of assets for the average firm). Together with the evidence on equity issues, this is consistent with the existence of debt overhang problem in highly leveraged firms.
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Second, we test the existence of the risk shifting problem by examining risk and volatility. 11 We find that after Credit Lyonnais, the standard deviation of ROA falls (again, only for high leverage firms), the monthly standard deviation of equity returns falls, and the implied volatility of asset value falls. These effects are fairly modest in magnitude, however. For example, annual asset volatility falls by about 0.4%. The findings on risk are indirect, in the sense that we provide no evidence on board decision making or firm policies that may have caused the increase in risk (although we do rule out a mechanical link to the level of investment).
Third, we examine bankruptcy duration, based on the idea that creditors prefer bankruptcies to be short, and that bankruptcy duration can therefore be used as a proxy for indirect bankruptcy costs (see Franks and Torous 1989 , Ayotte and Skeel 2004 , and Bris, Welch and Zhu 2009 . We find that both Delaware and non-Delaware bankruptcies became shorter after Credit Lyonnais, and that the fall was larger and more significant for Delaware bankruptcies (the difference-in-difference estimate is 4.7 months, or 19% of the pre-Credit Lyonnais average), but that the difference is insignificantly different from zero. 12 This result is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Fourth, if Credit Lyonnais reduced agency costs of debt, equilibrium leverage should increase and the cost of debt fall. As predicted, we find that the leverage of Delaware firms increased by approximately 0.6% of assets after 1991 (relative to the change for non-Delaware firms), whereas the cost of debt fell by 17 basis points (compared to an average value of 10.3%).
The welfare implications of these findings are not obvious. It is possible that creditor-friendly director duties, such as the ones in place after 1991 in Delaware, reduce agency costs of financial distress. This would improve welfare, and increase firm value. In this case, both equity and debt values should increase upon the announcement of the new ruling. On the other hand, the fiduciary duties might be a pure reallocation from equity to debt, generating no net costs of financial distress. In this case, the price of debt could still increase, but the price of equity could go down, leaving the aggregate firm value and cost of capital unaffected. In this case, there are no aggregate welfare effects. One way to distinguish between these theories is to examine the change in equity values around the time of Credit Lyonnais (under the assumption that debt values do not decrease, which seems plausible).
To test these competing theories, we examine the response of equity prices around the announcement of the ruling. 13 We find that Delaware firms increased in equity value by 60.6 basis points (relative to non-Delaware) firms on Dec, 30, 1991, the day that the case ruling was announced (t-stat 3.1). We interpret this return differential as a measure of the announcement effect for Credit Lyonnais. The value-weighted return differential on the day of the ruling was 41.4 bp (t-stat 5.9). 14 Dec, 30 was the third highest daily Delaware to non-Delaware difference in 1991. The five day announcement return was 6 206 bp (equal weighted, t-stat 4.9) and 55 basis points (value weighted, t-stat 3.4). Residual returns from the CAPM or the Fama-French three factor model (both estimated in the first 11 months of 1991) suggest slightly smaller effects: 145 and 77 basis points (equal weighted and value-weighted, t-stats 3.5 and 1.8). These returns are also higher than the Delaware-non Delaware return differentials at other year-ends (so are likely not driven by tax considerations).
The valuation improvements for Delaware firms following the Credit Lyonnais ruling suggest that equitydebt conflicts do indeed come with significant costs, and that ex-ante, those costs are borne by equity (Fama and Jensen 1983 ). An important implication is that reducing conflict creates value. In addition, this is consistent with the view of the capital structure literature that there must be large intangible costs of financial distress to motivate observed capital structures (see e.g. Myers 1993 ).
This paper is related to several strands of research. First, it is generally related to the literature on stakeholder corporations and the optimal allocation of corporate control rights (see Zingales, 2000) . And the discussion of whether fiduciary should be extended to other stakeholders (see e.g. Tirole, 2001 ). Our evidence suggests that extending fiduciary duties to include creditors for firms close to insolvency may be welfare-increasing. Second, our paper is related to literature on competition between states in corporate law (see, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 2002) . The Credit Lyonnais duties are a prime example of how important the Delaware courts are, and how the differences between Delaware corporate law and other jurisdictions can be of significance. Third, the paper is related to the trade-off theory of capital structure and other work on the agency costs of debt. Many of the key papers are cited above. Among papers that find evidence pointing away from equity-debt conflict are Parrino and Weisbach (1999) and Rauh (2009) (in both cases, the topic is risk shifting). Among papers with more supportive findings are Esty (1997) (for financial firms), Shleifer and Summers (1988) (equity appropriates value from other stakeholders), and Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) (indirect evidence from financially distressed junk bond issuers). Finally, our paper also relates to the legal literature that has analyzed the emergence of Delaware as a preferred bankruptcy venue in the 1990s (see e.g.. LoPucki and Doherty (2006) and Rasmussen and Thomas (2000) ). Ayotte and Skeel (2004) document that Delaware bankruptcies are faster than bankruptcies in other courts, and argue that this is due to the higher efficiency of the Delaware bankruptcy courts. Our paper provides an alternative (and complementary) explanation for their finding, namely that firm behavior changed for Delaware firms in the vicinity of bankruptcy, which enabled them to enter Chapter 11 in a healthier state, thus making bankruptcy resolution easier.
The rest of paper the paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the theory of equity-debt holder conflicts and financial distress. The subsequent section concerns the Credit Lyonnais ruling and its implications. We then describe the datasets we use, the results of our empirical tests, and conclusions.
Fiduciary duties and the Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications case 7
Corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders. Ordinarily, they do not owe fiduciary duties to creditors (or any other stakeholders). Once a firm is insolvent, this changes, and the corporation's creditors can sue directors for breach of fiduciary duties. Prior to Credit Lyonnais, the generally held understanding of Delaware law was that officers did not owe fiduciary duty to creditors prior to insolvency. The case changed this understanding, and created fiduciary duties sometime prior to bankruptcy and insolvency.
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The Credit Lyonnais case followed the leveraged buyout of MGM Corporation in November 1990, financed by several banks and Time Warner (the seller). The newly private company had trouble meeting financial obligations almost immediately, and trade creditors forced it into bankruptcy court within five months. As part of the exit from bankruptcy, MGM secured a credit line from the U.S. subsidiary of Credit Lyonnais, a French bank. Pathe Communications, MGM's controlling stockholder, and Credit Lyonnais also entered into a corporate governance agreement. Subsequently, Credit Lyonnais used its contractual right under that agreement to replace MGM directors, including the CEO. Pathe's owners felt the new CEO favored creditor's interests, and sued, claiming among other things that the new CEO breached a duty of good faith owed to them.
The case (in fact, several lawsuits that were considered together) was ruled by Chancellor William Allen, a respected Delaware bankruptcy judge. In the November 1991 ruling, the court held that the CEO had been "
appropriately mindful of the potential differing interests between the corporation and its 98% shareholder. At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise".
In footnote 55 of the ruling, the fiduciary duties of firms in financial distress were discussed: "in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders… would make".
The Credit Lyonnais case, and especially footnote 55, quickly became the focus of attention in the business press and among lawyers. Reuters reported a long newswire on December 30, titled "Court upholds Parretti Ouster from MGM", focusing on how the decision favored creditors over the owners.
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Dow Jones Newswire and PR Newswire also covered the ruling on December 30. The Wall Street Journal covered the story extensively the following day, emphasizing that the ruling confirmed the bank's extensive governance role (but did not explicitly mentioning the fiduciary duties of the board or footnote 55). Apart from the Wall Street Journal, there were at least twenty-three newspaper stories about the case the following day (including in The Baltimore Sun, Chicago Sun-Times, Houston Chronicle, Financial Post, The Globe and Mail, The Las Vegas Review-Journal, The San Francisco Chronicle, the New York Times, Financial Times, St Louis Post-Dispatch, and the Washington Post).
15 What was generally believed by practicing corporate lawyers and corporate directors is more important than whether or not the perception was correct (i.e. was an accurate prediction of hypothetical future case outcomes).
There is uncertainty about many legal rules under a common-law legal system (such as the in the US). See Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) for a discussion of this. 16 This followed extensive coverage of the case during the Fall (e.g., eight Reuters news stories about the case in December alone). Delaware courts handled many bankruptcies and other corporate legal matters during the sample period we consider, but no other case relating to bankruptcy seems to have been as important or have received anything like the wide attention devoted to Credit Lyonnais. Approximately fifteen Delaware cases were mentioned in the Wall Street Journal during 1991-1992. While the Wall Street Journal only provides a crude proxy for legal importance, it likely does reflect public attention fairly well. The cases mentioned in the WSJ related to product liability, class action law suits, financial reporting, merger and acquisitions and anti-trust. None of the cases discuss the ruling in any detail, and most are only brief notes. Only one of the cases concerned fiduciary duties, in relation to a merger (some shareholders thought the board made the wrong decision about a tender offer). Unlike Credit Lyonnais, none of these cases appear to have set important precedents.
More recently, Delaware case law has limited the extent of the Credit Lyonnais fiduciary duties. Delaware courts have reemphasized that creditors can protect their interests "through contractual agreements … and other sources of creditor rights." (Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, 2004) . The Delaware Supreme court, in N. Am. Cath. Ed. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 2007, held the general view of market participants was most likely that management owed fiduciary duties to creditors when the firm was in the "zone of insolvency."
The Credit Lyonnais ruling set a precedent for firms incorporated in Delaware, but had no prejudicial power for other firms. Because about half of U.S. public corporations are incorporated there, the case provides a useful division of public firms into treated and untreated groups. This division relies on a firm distinction between Delaware and non-Delaware corporate law. However, other jurisdictions may incorporate ideas and learn from Delaware (see Linos 2006) . Our empirical strategy relies on the comparison of firms incorporated in Delaware relative to those outside Delaware, so such "leakage" might be problematic. We believe this problem is limited for three reasons. First, fiduciary duties can be the subject of legislation, and thereby outside of the scope of precedents. 21 We have implemented our tests excluding states without constituency statutes, i.e. where fiduciary duties are legislated (but not excluding Delaware), with similar results. Second, we restrict our tests to five years before and after the Credit Lyonnais case. Thus, even if there is leakage of legal rules from Delaware, but it is not very fast, it should not affect our results. Finally, if there were some leakage even during the short window we study, that will tend to obscure the impact of Credit Lyonnais. Thus, if we find significant changes after the case, as we do, this concern suggests that we may underestimate the magnitudes slightly.
Data
We collect firm level information on accounting data and state of incorporation from Compustat, covering the 1986-1997 period. We use five years before (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) and five years after the event (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , and include data from 1986 to be able to calculate changes in variables. We use Compustat's incorporation code. Of the 6,608 firms in 1991, we identify 44.4% as incorporated in Delaware. The Delaware firms tend to be slightly larger (median assets $82.0 million versus $71.8 million for non-Delaware firms), consistent with Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) . The Compustat incorporation data is backfilled (i.e., at any point in time, Compustat reports the current state of incorporation). This reduces concerns about endogeneity, but may introduce measurement error. For a subsample of 485 firms we verified the state of incorporation during our sample, and there were 37 differences, i.e. less than 8% of firms appeared misclassified. Moodie (2004) Firm control variables are defined from Compustat and CRSP variables as follows. ROA is Ebitda divided by total assets (At). ROS is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (Ebitda) divided by sales. The log of market value is the natural logarithm of the number of shares outstanding times the end of year share price. Leverage is assets minus common equity (book value) and minus tax liabilities, divided by assets. Market leverage is assets minus common equity (book value) and minus tax liabilities, divided by assets minus common equity (book value) and minus tax liabilities plus market value of equity. We define Q as assets minus common equity (book value) plus the market value of equity minus tax liabilities, divided by assets minus 0.1 times common equity (book value) and plus 0. We used daily factor returns from Kenneth French's web site, together with CRSP daily returns, to estimate CAPM and Fama French-3-factor models for January to November 1991. We only used returns calculated from consecutive transaction prices (not bid-ask spreads). The loadings (beta estimates) were used to calculate one and five day residuals for the period following the announcement of the ruling in the Credit Lyonnais case (Dec, 30, 1991) . Average stock returns, as well as average CAPM and FF residuals, equal and value weighted, were calculated for firms incorporated in Delaware and firms incorporated in other states, respectively.
We calculate bankruptcy durations as the time from filing to exit, using Lynn LoPucki's database on large corporate bankruptcies (assets of at least 100 million prior to filing, in 1980 dollars).
Summary statistics are in provided in Table 1 .
Results
In this section, we evaluate the effect of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling on firms in Delaware. We employ a difference-in-difference method (see e.g. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004) , using the fact that firms in Delaware were subject to a different legal environment after November 1991, but that firms outside Delaware were not. We examine a range of corporate outcomes, and use regressions with firm and year combinations defining the unit of observations. This permits controlling extensively for firm level variables. We use return on assets, return on sales, the log of assets (book value), the log of sales, the log of equity market value, depreciation over assets, book leverage (defined as assets minus equity minus deferred taxes, over assets), and market leverage (defined as assets minus book equity minus deferred taxes, over assets minus book equity plus market equity), two year lagged stock return, and Tobin's q (capped at 10). We also include firm fixed effects. Firm fixed effects allow controlling for many sources of unmeasured heterogeneity between firms, reducing the potential for omitted variables problems. 24 Because of the firm fixed effects, firms that only appear before or after the 1991 cut-off do not help identify the Credit Lyonnais coefficient in our regressions (they do help identify other coefficients). Therefore, compositional changes in the Delaware and non-Delaware firm populations will be econometrically unimportant for our identification.
Payout and equity issues
When a firm is distressed, it may be in the interest of equity-holders to increase payout and limit new equity finance, even if this forces the firm to forego valuable investment opportunities. To examine if Credit Lyonnais reduced such behavior, we examine dividends, repurchases and equity issues. First we examine firm payouts. We control for firm variables, firm and time fixed effects, a Delaware indicator, and the interaction between the Delaware dummy and a dummy for observations after 1991 ("Delaware 12 * After 1991"), which identifies the marginal effect of Credit Lyonnais. 25 We cluster errors by the interaction of year and the Delaware dummy throughout. We have also used state of incorporation*year clustering or simply state of incorporation. These alternatives give very similar tstats, occasionally somewhat higher. Clustering by firm gives much smaller standard errors.
Regressions are reported in Table 1 . There is no effect for dividends (column one) or repurchases (column two). This implies that, apart from what's explained by firm controls and overall time series patterns capture by fixed effects, Delaware firms did not experience a change in payout policy compared to non-Delaware firms in the wake of Credit Lyonnais.
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Covenants may explain why we see no effect of Credit Lyonnais on payout: payout was circumscribed for firms in and near distress even before Credit Lyonnais. Perhaps fiduciary duties had no further bite, so Credit Lyonnais did not matter for dividends even if it did change duties in a meaningful way. Covenants, being contract clauses, are likely to be more effective at limiting behavior (e.g. payout) than at encouraging it (e.g. investment). They may therefore specifically suggest why we observe no effect on payout, but large significant effects in other areas, as we will show below. Common covenants that limit payout include those that limit the ratio of debt to equity or tangible net worth (since dividends and repurchases reduce the denominators).
In contrast with the payout results, we find a positive coefficient on the Credit Lyonnais dummy for equity issues. The relative increase in equity issuances of Delaware firms is 62 basis points of assets per year, about a tenth of the sample average. The coefficient is significant at the 10% level using errors clustered at the year*Delaware level (i.e. twenty clusters). Next we regress an indicator for equity issues above zero on the Credit Lyonnais indicator and controls. This variable discards the information contained in the amount of equity issues, but is less affected by outliers. The estimated effect is positive and significant, suggesting that Credit Lyonnais increased the likelihood of firms issuing equity by 2.67%. With this result in hand, we can ask if there is a difference between high and low debt firms, since Credit Lyonnais should have affected the incentives of the first group much more. 27 We therefore split the sample in (approximately) two based on book leverage, and repeat the regression in column four for each subsample separately. As predicted, there is a large and significant effect for high leverage firms, but no effect for low leverage firms (the coefficient estimate is positive but not significantly different from zero).
28 25 We have tried including separate dummies for each individual state of incorporation. However, this variation does not affect our findings of interest. Therefore we present results distinguishing only between Delaware and other states. Furthermore, we have included industry times year interaction dummies, but they do not change results noticeably, so we exclude them. 26 We have found the same absence of an effect using alternative normalizations of dividends and repurchases, including net income, cash flow and market value of equity. 27 One common implication from theories of equity-debt conflict is that the conflict of interest between equity and debt is expected to be most severe when debt ratios are high. 28 We have also used splits based on distance-to-default, measured as the difference of log assets and log liabilities divided by asset volatility. The results are very similar.
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The results for payout and equity issues provide some evidence consistent with debt-equity conflicts. In particular, the higher equity issues after 1991 in Delaware are in line with the predictions of the debt overhang hypothesis. The other main implication of that theory is that distressed firms inefficiently reduce investment, which we turn to next.
Investment
We now consider whether agency conflicts result in lower investment caused due to debt overhang. We use three measures of investment: CAPEX over assets, CAPEX and R&D over assets, and CAPEX and R&D over sales. The regressions are presented in Table 3 . Unlike payout, investment is likely not subject to much limitation by covenants (covenants that limit investment in the upward direction are common, but we consider an increase in investment).
In the first column, we regress a measure of investment on the Credit Lyonnais dummy and controls. The overall fit of the regression is good, mostly reflecting the high explanatory power of firm fixed effects. The coefficient estimate for the Credit Lyonnais indicator (Delaware firms after 1991) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words, after 1991, investment is higher for firms incorporated in Delaware, compared to firms incorporated elsewhere, controlling for firm averages and ten performance and accounting variables. The magnitude is fairly large, amounting to an increase in CAPEX by 49 basis points of assets. The mean of this variable is 6.8 percent of assets per year, so the effect is equal to seven percent of mean investment. Since this is an estimate taken over the entire firm population, the implied aggregate investment foregone by distressed firms before Credit Lyonnais may be non-trivial. In column two, we instead use a dummy variable indicating whether a firm's investment is above the median for firms in that industry in that year as the dependent variable. This avoids any concerns about outliers. The coefficient estimate is 0.0274, implying that Credit Lyonnais reduced the probability of investing below industry-year median by 2.74%. In column three, we include R&D expenditures in the dependent variable. This may correspond better to the theory (i.e. Myers 1977 concerns all forms of investment including in intangibles), but reduces the sample size due to the imperfect reporting of R&D expenditure in COMPUSTAT. The implied magnitude corresponds to about four percent of mean investment. In column four, we normalize by sales instead of assets, with similar results (the estimated effect is 0.93% of sales, corresponding to seven percent of mean investment).
As with equity issues, we split the sample by leverage and compare the effect on investment for the subsamples. We estimate the basic CAPEX regression separately in each sub sample. The effect of Credit Lyonnais is isolated to the higher leverage subsample, as predicted by the debt overhang theory. There is no effect on investment by low leverage firms. The estimated effect for high leverage firms is 59 basis points, or about nine percent of capex average investment for this group.
Overall, then, the results for firm investment suggest that debt overhang matters for distressed firms.
Risk and volatility
The theory of risk-shifting predicts that equity holders in firms with risky debt can benefit at the expense of debt-holders by increasing firm risk. This is contrary to the interest of debt-holders, and is therefore the sort of action that could be affected by the change in fiduciary duties induced by Credit Lyonnais.
We test if there is a reduction in risk of Delaware firms after 1991 and if any such pattern is driven by relatively high leverage firms. This is a challenging test to implement, because there are few good measures of operational risk. We use three proxies, each potentially subject to criticism. First, we use the trailing standard deviation of eight quarterly changes in ROA. This requires a fair amount of accounting data, yet provides a noisy estimate of risk that is likely to be slow to reflect changes in corporate policy. The advantage of this measure is that we avoid using financial prices, which may be affected by other factors than operating policy. The second measure is monthly equity price volatility over the last year. Because it relies on one year of history instead of two, it may be better at picking up time series changes. However, equity volatility may be affected by corporate leverage as well as various market factors. To mitigate the first of these problems, we also use implied asset volatility from the Merton (1973) model as our third measure of risk.
Regression tests of changes in risk around 1991 are presented in table 4. In column one, the dependent variable is the volatility of ROA. The estimated coefficient for the Credit Lyonnais indicator is negative and significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The magnitude is 25 basis points, corresponding to about four percent of the mean of annual ROA standard deviation. The overall fit of the regression is good, mostly reflecting the high explanatory power of firm fixed effects. 29 In column two, the dependent variable is equity volatility. Here, the negative effect is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient estimate is 80 basis points, corresponding to about five percent of the mean of equity volatility. The implied magnitude for asset volatility is slightly smaller, 44 basis points, significant at the 5% level.
As with previous tests, we wish to compare low and high debt firms. In column four and five, we repeat the regression from column three (i.e., using asset volatility as the dependent variable) for a sample cut in approximately half based on book leverage. There is a negative and significant negative coefficient (71 basis points) for the high leverage sample, and a smaller (53 basis points) insignificant effect for the low debt sample.
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The results in Table 3 are consistent with deliberate reduction in volatility by corporations in Delaware after Credit Lyonnais. As with the earlier findings, results are driven primarily by high leverage firms. The evidence is indirect, however, and provides no direct evidence of what managerial choices produce the extra risk. It is not clear which types of management or board decisions that may change the risk profile of (non-financial) firms. Nevertheless, it appears that risk is lower for the firms affected by Credit Lyonnais.
Bankruptcy duration
We next consider the duration of bankruptcies. This has been used as a measure of indirect bankruptcy costs by, e.g., Franks and Torous (1989) and Bris, Welch and Zhu 2009 . The motivation is that operating in bankruptcy may hurt business operations and product market performance, and that a longer bankruptcy therefore may be more harmful to creditors.
We find that both Delaware and non-Delaware bankruptcies became shorter after Credit Lyonnais, falling by 6.3 months outside Delaware and by 11.0 months in Delaware (see Figure 2) . The drop in Delaware is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, and the drop outside Delaware is insignificant. However, the difference-in-difference, 4.7 months, or 19% of the pre-Credit Lyonnais average, is insignificantly different from zero, largely because the wide confidence interval around the drop for non-Delaware firms.
This evidence, while statistically weak, is consistent with faster bankruptcies in the wake of Credit Lyonnais, thereby likely reducing losses imposed on creditors. Given the statistical weakness, and the fact that there is a simultaneous (but smaller) drop outside Delaware, we consider this evidence suggestive
Capital structure impact
If Credit Lyonnais reduces costs of financial distress, it ought to increase equilibrium leverage. For example, the trade-off theory predicts that lower distress costs allow firms to take advantage of the tax shields provided by higher leverage. In Table 5 , we therefore regress measures of leverage on firm controls, firm and time fixed effects, and the Credit Lyonnais indicator. For tests where the dependent variable involves leverage, the controls exclude book and market leverage.
In columns one and two, we find that Credit Lyonnais coincides with small increases in both book and market leverage, 33 and 27 basis points respectively (both significantly different from zero at the ten percent level). The small economic magnitude of these estimates may not be too surprising given the fact that deliberate actions drive only modest year-to-year changes in leverage (e.g., firms' market leverage is largely driven by equity price changes Welch, 2004) .
To accurately measure the firms' true indebtedness it may be important to measure debt net of cash (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 2004) . Net debt is also increased following Credit Lyonnais, with a point estimate of 89 basis points. This effect is larger than the effect for gross leverage, corresponding to four percent of the standard deviation of the dependent variable (the mean for net debt is low, 0.17, so the estimated effect is larger in compared to the mean). The effect is highly significant. In column four, we test whether interest costs were affected by the Credit Lyonnais ruling, controlling for leverage. If agency costs of debt were reduced by the ruling, interest costs should fall. Indeed, controlling for leverage and other controls, interest costs are lower by 25 basis points following Credit Lyonnais, which can be compared to a mean interest rate of 10.4 percent (i.e. the reduction in interest costs are around 2% of the mean cost). In the last column, we examine the effect on an indicator equal to one if interest costs are above 10% (this is close to the Compustat median in each of the sample years). The coefficient is negative and significant, implying that Credit Lyonnais reduced the likelihood that a firm paid above 10% for its debt by 2.2%.
The leverage increase following Credit Lyonnais is modest, but important. The concurrent fall in interest costs establishes that the leverage increase was not the result of increased credit demand (in which case interest paid would be expected to go up). Taken together, higher leverage and lower interest rates suggest that the reduction in equity-debt conflict that Credit Lyonnais produced had an impact on capital structure.
Valuation
To assess the welfare impact we turn to equity values. An implication of most theories of agency costs of debt is that equityholders will pay the costs from these anticipated conflicts ex ante when the firm raises debt, through higher interest rates and restrictive covenants, and pay using less debt (thus missing out on, e.g., tax advantages). We can test this using information in stock prices.
To assess the valuation impact of Credit Lyonnais, we compare the returns of Delaware and nonDelaware firms at the time the Credit Lyonnais ruling was delivered. In general, the relative valuation of Delaware and non-Delaware firms is stable. In daily returns during 1991, the standard deviation of the equal weighted aggregate market index is 71 basis points, but the standard deviation of the Delawarenon-Delaware daily return difference (also equal weighted) is only 24 basis points. Thus, we may be able to identify even fairly modest effects. Delaware firms in general should benefit from Credit Lyonnais, for example through lower interest rates, but the effect should not be homogenous across firms of different capital structure. Low leverage firms have less to gain form Credit Lyonnais, and unlevered firms may get no benefit (although if they may raise debt in the future, there may be some benefit). Firms with higher leverage would appear to have more to gain, since they can save more on interest costs, and would appear more at risk for various games at creditors' expense. These effects will be diluted if stock prices take into account expected future changes in agency costs and firms are not expected to maintain current capital structures indefinitely. For example, a firm with little debt may see no effective changes immediately (consistent with e.g. our investment results), but if it is expected that the firm may have debt in the future, firm value may increase with Credit Lyonnais. For owners of firms with very high leverage, the benefits of Credit Lyonnais may be somewhat negated, since equityholders may actually gain from risk shifting and other games. We therefore predict a reverse U-shape to the relation between leverage and announcement period return differentials between Delaware and non-Delaware firms.
The case ruling was announced on Dec, 30, 1991, was immediately reported on newswires and was covered extensively by the press the following day. 31 We assign December, 30, as the announcement day, but it is plausible that the news, if relevant to market prices, would only be reflected in market prices after a few more days, or at least after news reports on the day after. As it turns out, magnitudes change, the direction of results is not very sensitive to the number of days included in the announcement returns.
We find that Delaware firms increased in value by 60.6 basis points (relative to non-Delaware firms) on the day of the ruling, with a t-statistic of 3.1(the value-weighted differential was 41.4 basis points, t-stat 5.9). This was the second highest return differential in 1991. The positive effect was not reversed or crowded out by later returns. The five trading day window starting on December, 30 and running to January, 6, 1992, saw a 206 basis point relative increase in Delaware firm values, equal weighted, with a t-statistic of 4.9. The value-weighted five-day return was 55 basis points (t-stat 3.4). Residual returns, which control for factor loadings, may allow cleaner identification of the announcement effects. Residual from the CAPM or the Fama-French three factor model (both estimated for each stock in the first 11 months of 1991) were 145 (t-stat 3.5) and 77 (t-stat 1.8) basis points, respectively.
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These effects on equity values provide further evidence that debt-equity conflict cause financial distress costs, that these costs can affect firm values in a negative way, and that ex-ante, the costs are borne by equity holders, consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983) .
It may be interesting to compare the response to the Credit Lyonnais announcement across firms. For example, very high leverage firms might gain less from Credit Lyonnais (because there owners wanted to risk-shift or under-invest). Similarly, low leverage firms might have gained less (because they had no debt on which to save interest costs) or more (they had more scope to increase leverage in response to changed conditions). Figure 3 presents a third degree polynomial fit to the return difference across firms with various levels of book leverage. 33 The estimated relation between leverage and return differentials roughly follows an inverse U shape. At low levels of leverage, the return differential is increasing in leverage, reaching an estimated peak around 0.15, where the predicted return is 50 basis points, after which return differential is falling in leverage. The graph falls to a low prediction of about 12 basis points around a leverage of 0.6, and then turns positive. However, this is estimated in the tail of the leverage distribution (the empirical leverage distribution is plotted in the graph, for reference). Therefore, the precise shape of the curve is not precisely estimated. A 95% confidence interval for the estimated regression line is plotted on the graph, showing this uncertainty about the precise shape. The general pattern is consistent with the prediction that the average benefits of Credit Lyonnais were largest for firms with positive but modest leverage, but low or insignificant for high leverage firms.
Conclusions
The Credit Lyonnais case created fiduciary duties toward creditors in Delaware-incorporated firms in "zone of insolvency". Because this did not affect firms incorporated outside Delaware, Credit Lyonnais provides a natural experiment for examining whether and how equity-debt conflict affects firm behavior. In our tests we control for time and firm fixed effects and eliminate changes affecting the whole firm population by differencing with non-Delaware firms. We find important changes in behavior after Credit Lyonnais. Firms increase equity issues and investment, consistent with debt overhang. Firms reduced operational and financial risk, consistent with risk shifting and asset substitution theories. 32 An alternative way of forming standard errors is to repeat the analysis for other year-ends. This will be more conservative if there are year-end Delaware-non Delaware patterns for, e.g., tax reasons. Considering the 1980/81 through 2007/07 year-ends, twenty-eight observations, the 1991/92 returns are the second highest return (comparing second to last trading day of each year) or highest (five day returns starting second to last trading day). The t-stats implied by the standard errors from these regressions are 2.7 (one day) and 3.0 (five days), both implying significance at the 1% level. 33 The graph is based on coefficient estimates from a regression of the daily return on 12/20/1991 on a Delaware dummy, three powers of leverage, and the interaction of the Delaware dummy with the leverage powers. The graph is based on these coefficient estimates.
Credit Lyonnais appears to have had no impact on firms with low leverage, as predicted, since these firms were not in the zone of insolvency, almost certainly were not financially distressed, and likely were far from bankruptcy. Instead, the effects are isolated to the subset of firms where leverage is above the median. This is consistent with Credit Lyonnais being the true driver of our results, and is inconsistent with explanations involving contemporaneous changes specific to Delaware firms.
We conclude that firm in distress sometimes have an incentive to undertake actions that hurts debt and favors equity. Such behavior leads to indirect costs of financial distress, discouraging leverage and reducing overall firm value. Indeed, we find that Credit Lyonnais was followed by slight increases in leverage, and a modest increase in average firm values around the time of announcement. Firms thus appear to have reaped immediate benefits of lower agency costs in the form of better access to debt at lower costs. In addition, stock prices responded positively to the ruling, especially for firms with high but not ultra-high debt, confirming the welfare impact of agency costs.
Our results are consistent with theories of capital structure based on agency costs. Such costs are an important part of how the trade-off theory of capital structure is usually understood (see Myers 2003) . Moreover, agency costs due to debt-equity conflicts have important implications beyond the simple trade-off framework, which would be interesting to explore in future research.
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